The Gaussian Multiple Access Wire-Tap Channel with Collective Secrecy
  Constraints by Tekin, Ender & Yener, Aylin
ar
X
iv
:c
s/0
60
50
23
v1
  [
cs
.IT
]  
6 M
ay
 20
06
The Gaussian Multiple Access Wire-Tap Channel
with Collective Secrecy Constraints
Ender Tekin
tekin@psu.edu
Aylin Yener
yener@ee.psu.edu
Wireless Communications and Networking Laboratory
Electrical Engineering Department
The Pennsylvania State University
University Park, PA 16802
Abstract— We consider the Gaussian Multiple Access Wire-Tap
Channel (GMAC-WT). In this scenario, multiple users commu-
nicate with an intended receiver in the presence of an intelligent
and informed wire-tapper who receives a degraded version of
the signal at the receiver. We define a suitable security measure
for this multi-access environment. We derive an outer bound for
the rate region such that secrecy to some pre-determined degree
can be maintained. We also find, using Gaussian codebooks, an
achievable such secrecy region. Gaussian codewords are shown to
achieve the sum capacity outer bound, and the achievable region
concides with the outer bound for Gaussian codewords, giving
the capacity region when inputs are constrained to be Gaussian.
We present numerical results showing the new rate region and
compare it with that of the Gaussian Multiple-Access Channel
(GMAC) with no secrecy constraints.
I. INTRODUCTION
Shannon, in [1], analyzed secrecy systems in communi-
cations and he showed that to achieve perfect secrecy of
communications, we must have the conditional probability of
the cryptogram given a message independent of the actual
transmitted message.
In [2], Wyner applied this concept to the discrete memory-
less channel, with a wire-tapper who has access to a degraded
version of the intended receiver’s signal. He measured the
amount of “secrecy” using the conditional entropy ∆, the
conditional entropy of the transmitted message given the
received signal at the wire-tapper. The region of all possible
(R,∆) pairs is determined, and the existence of a secrecy
capacity, Cs, for communication below which it is possible to
transmit zero information to the wire-tapper is shown [2].
Carleial and Hellman, in [3], showed that it is possible
to send several low-rate messages, each completely protected
from the wire-tapper individually, and use the channel at close
to capacity. The drawback is, in this case, if any of the
messages are revealed to the wire-tapper, the others might
also be compromised. In [4], the authors extended Wyner’s
results to Gaussian channels and also showed that Carleial and
Hellman’s results in [3] also held for the Gaussian channel [4].
Csisza´r and Ko¨rner, in [5], showed that Wyner’s results can be
extended to weaker, so called “less noisy” and “more capable”
channels. Furthermore, they analyzed the more general case
of sending common information to both the receiver and
the wire-tapper, and private information to the receiver only.
More recently, Maurer showed in [6] that a public feedback
channel can make secret communications possible even when
the secrecy capacity is zero.
In [7] we extended these concepts to the GMAC and defined
two separate secrecy constraints, which we called individual
and collective secrecy constraints. We concerned ourselves
mainly with the perfect secrecy rate region for both sets of
constraints. For the individual constraints, this corresponds to
the entropy of the transmitted messages given the received
wire-tapper signal and the other users’ transmitted signals
being equal to the entropy of the transmitted message. The col-
lective secrecy constraints provided a more relaxed approach
and utilized other users’ signals as an additional source of
secrecy protection. In this paper, we consider the GMAC-
WT and focus on the ”collective secrecy constraints” for the
GMAC-WT, defined in [7] as the normalized entropy of any set
of messages conditioned on the wire-tapper’s received signal.
We consider the general case where a pre-determined level
of secrecy is provided. Under these constraints, we find an
outer bound for the secure rate region. Using random Gaussian
codebooks, we find an achievable secure rate region for each
constraint, where users can communicate with arbitrarily small
probability of error with the intended receiver, while the wire-
tapper is kept ignorant to a pre-determined level. We show
that when we constrain ourselves to using Gaussian code-
books, these bounds coincide and give the capacity region for
Gaussian codebooks. Furthermore, it is shown that Gaussian
codebooks achieve sum capacity for the GMAC-WT using
simultaneous superposition coding, [8]. We also show that a
simple TDMA scheme using the results of [4] for the single-
user case also achieves sum capacity, but provides a strictly
smaller region than shown in this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider K users communicating with a receiver in the
presence of a wire-tapper, as illustrated in Figure 1.
Transmitter j chooses a message Wj from a set of equally
likely messages {1, . . . ,Mj}. The messages are encoded using
(2nRj , n) codes into {Xnj (Wj)}, where Rj = 1n log2Mj .
The encoded messages are then transmitted, and the intended
receiver and the wire-tapper each get a copy Y n and Zn. We
would like to communicate with the receiver with arbitrarily
low probability of error, while maintaining perfect secrecy, the
eavesdropper
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Fig. 1. The GMAC-WT System Model
exact definition of which will be made precise shortly.
The signal at the intended receiver is given by
Y =
K∑
j=1
Xj +N1 (1)
and the wire-tapper receives
Z = Y +N2 (2)
where each component of Ni ∼ N
(
0, σ2i
)
, i = 1, 2. We also
assume the following received power constraints:
1
n
n∑
i=1
X2ji ≤ Pj,max, j = 1, . . . ,K (3)
A. The Secrecy Measure
We aim to provide each user with a pre-determined amount
of secrecy. To that end, in [7], we used an approach similar
to [4], and defined a set of secrecy constraints using the
normalized equivocations for sets of users:
∆S ,
H(WS |Z)
H(WS)
∀S ⊆ K (4)
where K = {1, . . . ,K} and WS = {Wj}j∈S .
As our secrecy criterion, we require that each user j ∈
{1, . . . ,K} must satisfy ∆S ≥ δ for all sets S ⊆ K, and
δ ∈ [0, 1] is the required level of secrecy. δ = 1 corresponds to
perfect secrecy, where the wire-tapper is not allowed to get any
information; and δ = 0 corresponds to no secrecy constraint.
This constraint guarantees that each subset of users maintains
a level of secrecy greater than δ. Since this must be true for
all sets of users, collectively the system has at least the same
level of secrecy. However, if a group of users are somehow
compromised, the remaining users may also be vulnerable.
B. The δ-secret rate region
Definition 1 (Achievable rates with δ-secrecy). The rate
K-tuple R = (R1, . . . , RK) is said to be achievable with
δ-secrecy if for any given ǫ > 0 there exists a code of
sufficient length n such that
1
n
log2Mk ≥ Rk − ǫ k = 1, . . . ,K (5)
Pe ≤ ǫ (6)
∆S ≥ δ ∀S ⊆ K (7)
where user k chooses one of Mk symbols to transmit according
to the uniform distribution, and Pe is the average probability
of error. We will call the set of all achievable rates with δ-
secrecy, the δ-secret rate region, and denote it C(δ).
C. Some Preliminary Definitions
Before we state our results, we define the following quan-
tities for any S ⊆ K.
PS ,
∑
j∈S
Pj RS ,
∑
j∈S
Rj
C(M)S , C
(
PS
σ21
)
C(MW)S , C
(
PS
σ21 + σ
2
2
)
C˜(MW)S , C
(
PS
PSc + σ21 + σ
2
2
)
where C(ξ) , 12 log(1 + ξ). The quantities with S = K will
sometimes also be used with the subscript sum.
III. OUTER BOUND ON THE δ-SECRET RATE REGION
In this section, we present an outer bound on the set of
achievable δ-secret rates, denoted Cˆ(δ), and explicitly state the
outer bound on the achievable sum-rate with δ-secrecy. We
also evaluate this bound assuming we are limited to using
Gaussian codebooks for calculation purposes, Gˆ(δ).
Our main result is presented in the following theorem:
Theorem 2. For the GMAC-WT, the secure rate-tuples
(R1, . . . , RK) such that ∆S ≥ δ, ∀S ⊆ K must satisfy
RS ≤ C
(M)
S (8)
RS ≤
1
δ
[
C(M)S − C
( ∑
j∈S 2
2
n
H(Xj)
2πe (PSc + σ21 + σ
2
2)
)]
(9)
The set of all R satisfying (8) and (9) is denoted Cˆ(δ).
Corollary 2.1. The sum-rate with δ-secrecy satisfies
C(δ)sum =
K∑
j=1
Rj ≤ min
{
C(M)sum,
C(M)sum − C
(MW)
sum
δ
}
(10)
Corollary 2.2. The rate-tuples with δ-secrecy using Gaussian
codebooks must satisfy (8) and
RS ≤
C(M)S − C˜
(MW)
S
δ
∀S ⊆ K (11)
The set of all such R is denoted Gˆ(δ).
Proof: See Appendix I.
Remark: Since C(MW)K = C˜
(MW)
K , Corollary 2.2 indicates that
Gaussian codebooks have the same upper bound on sum
capacity given by Corollary 2.1.
IV. ACHIEVABLE δ-SECRET RATE REGIONS
A. Gaussian Codebooks
In this section, we find a set of achievable rates using Gaus-
sian codebooks, which we call Gˇ(δ), and show that Gaussian
codebooks achieve the limit on sum capacity. This region
coincides with our previous upper bound evaluated using
Gaussian codebooks, Gˆ(δ), giving the full characterization of
the δ-secret rate region using Gaussian codebooks, G(δ).
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Theorem 3. We can transmit with δ-secrecy using Gaussian
codebooks at rates satisfying (8) and (11). The region contain-
ing all R satisfying these equations is denoted Gˇ(δ).
Corollary 3.1. We can transmit with perfect secrecy (δ = 1)
using Gaussian codebooks at rates satisfying
RS ≤ C
(M)
S − C˜
(MW)
S (12)
Proof: See Appendix II. The corollary was also presented
in [7].
B. Time-Division
We can also use a TDMA scheme and the result of [4] to
get an achievable region:
Theorem 4. Consider this scheme: Let αk ∈ [0, 1], k =
1, . . . ,K and
∑K
k=1 αk = 1. User k only transmits αk of
the time with power Pk,max/αk using the scheme described
in [4]. Then, the following set of rates is achievable:
⋃
0α1∑K
k=1 αk=1
{
R : Rk ≤ αk
C
(
Pk,max
αkσ
2
1
)
− C
(
Pk,max
αk(σ21+σ
2
2)
)
δ
,
Rk ≤ αkC
(Pk,max
αkσ21
)
, k = 1, . . . ,K
}
(13)
We will call the set of all R satisfying the above, C(δ)TDMA.
Proof: Follows directly from [4, Theorem 1]
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
Figures 2–4 show the shapes of G(δ) for δ = 0, 0.5, 1 for two
users. When δ = 0, we are not concerned with secrecy, and
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the resulting region corresponds to the standard GMAC region,
[9]. The region for δ = 1 corresponds to the perfect secrecy
region - transmitting at rates within this region, it is possible
to send zero information to the wire-tapper. The intermediate
region, δ = 0.5, can be thought of as constraining at least half
the transmitted information to be secret. It can be seen that this
enlarges the region from the perfect secrecy case. In Figure 2,
it is shown that relaxing this constraint may provide a larger
region, the limit of which is the GMAC region. In Figures 3
and 4, however, this region is already equivalent to the GMAC
capcity region. Hence, relaxing our secrecy constraints will not
result in further improvement in the set of achievable rates.
Note that it is possible to send at capacity of the GMAC and
still provide a non-zero level of secrecy, the minimum value of
which depends on how much extra noise the wire-tapper sees.
Also shown in the figures is the regions achievable by the
TDMA scheme described in the previous section. Although
TDMA achieves the sum capacity with optimum time-sharing
parameters, this region is in general contained within G(δ).
One important point is the dependence of the perfect secrecy
region, G(1), on σ22 . It can easily be shown that as σ22 → ∞,
the perfect secrecy region coincides with the standard GMAC
region, G(0). Thus, when the wire-tapper sees a much noisier
channel than the intended receiver, it is possible to send
information with perfect secrecy at close to capacity. However,
when this is not the case, G(1) is limited by the noise powers
regardless of how much we increase the input powers, since
limPK→∞ C
(1)
sum = C(σ22/σ
2
1).
Another interesting note is that even when a user does not
have any information to send, it can still generate and send
random codewords to confuse the eavesdropper and help other
users. This can be seen in Figures 2 and 3 as the TDMA region
does not end at the “legs” of G(δ) when G(δ) is not equal to
the GMAC capacity region.
APPENDIX I
OUTER BOUNDS
We show that any achievable rate vector, R, needs to satisfy
Theorem 2. (8) is due to the converse of the GMAC coding
theorem. To see (9), start with a few lemmas:
Lemma 5. Let XS = {Xk}k∈S where S ⊆ K. Then,
RS ≤
1
nδ
I(XS ;Y|Z) + νn ∀S ⊆ K (14)
where νn → 0 as ǫ→ 0.
Proof: Let S ⊆ K and consider the two inequalities:
δ ≤ ∆S =
H(WS |Z)
log
(∏
j∈SMj
) ≤ H(WS |Z)
n (RS − |S|ǫ)
(15)
H(WS |Z,Y) ≤ H(WS |Y) ≤ H(WK|Y) ≤ ηn (16)
where (16) follows using Fano’s Inequality with ηn → 0 as
ǫ→ 0 and n→∞. Using (15) and (16), we can write
δ ≤
H(WS |Z) + ηn −H(WS |Z,Y)
n (RS − |S|ǫ)
(17)
≤
I(XS ;Y|Z) + ηn
n (RS − |S|ǫ)
(18)
with the last step using WS → XS → Y → Z. Rearranging
and defining νn , ηnnδ + |S|ǫ completes the proof.
Lemma 6 (Lemma 10 in [4]). Let ξ = 1
n
H(Y), then,
H(Z)−H(Y) ≥ nφ(ξ) ,
n
2
log
[
2πe
(
σ22 +
1
2πe
22ξ
)]
−nξ
(19)
Corollary 6.1.
H(Z)−H(Y) ≥
n
2
log
(
1 +
σ22
PK + σ21
)
(20)
Proof: The lemma is given in [4] and its proof is
omitted here since it is easily shown using the entropy power
inequality, [9]. To see the corollary, write
H(Y) ≤
n
2
log
(
2πe(PK + σ
2
1)
) (21)
Let H(Y) = nξ. Then, ξ ≤ 12 log
(
2πe(PK + σ
2
1)
)
, and
since φ(ξ) is a non-increasing function of ξ, we get φ(ξ) ≥
φ
(
1
2 log
(
2πe(PK + σ
2
1)
))
. Then, from Lemma 6,
H(Z)−H(Y) ≥
n
2
log
(
1 +
σ22
PK + σ21
)
(22)
Lemma 7. For the GMAC-WT,
I(XS ;Y|Z) ≤ nC
(M)
S − nC
(
1
2πe
∑
j∈S 2
2
n
H(Xj)
PSc + σ21 + σ
2
2
)
(23)
Corollary 7.1. For the GMAC-WT,
I(XK;Y|Z) ≤ n (C
(M)
sum − C
(MW)
sum) (24)
Proof: Start by writing
I(XS ,Y|Z) = H(XS |Z)−H(XS |Y,Z) (25)
= H(XS |Z)−H(XS |Y) (26)
= [H(XS)−H(XS |Y)]− [H(XS)−H(XS |Z)] (27)
≤ [H(XS |XSc)−H(XS |Y,XSc)]
− [H(XS)−H(XS |Z)] (28)
= I(XS ;Y|XSc)− I(XS ;Z) (29)
= H(Y|XSc)−H(Y|XK)− [H(Z)−H(Z|XS)] (30)
=
∑n
i=1H(Yi|Y
i−1,XSc)−
∑n
i=1H(Yi|Y
i−1,XK)
− [H(Z)−H(Z|XS)] (31)
≤
∑n
i=1H(Yi|XSc,i)−
∑n
i=1H(Yi|XK,i)
− [H(Z)−H(Z|XS)] (32)
≤
∑n
i=1
1
2
log
[
2πe
(
PS + σ
2
1
)]
−
∑n
i=1
1
2
log
(
2πeσ21
)
− [H(Z)−H(Z|XS)] (33)
= nC
(
PS/σ
2
1
)
− [H(Z)−H(Z|XS)] (34)
where (26) follows from XS → Y → Z and (32) follows
using the memoryless property of M. For the term in brackets,
start by using the entropy power inequality:
2
2
n
H(Z) ≥ 2
2
n
H(Z|XS ) +
∑
j∈S2
2
n
H(Xj) (35)
2
2
n
H(Z)− 2
n
H(Z|XS) ≥ 1 + 2−
2
n
H(Z|XS)
∑
j∈S
2
2
n
H(Xj) (36)
Then,
2
2
n
H(Z|XS ) = 2
2
n
∑
n
i=1 H(Zi|Z
i−1,XS) (37)
≤ 2
2
n
∑
n
i=1 H(Zi|XS,i) (38)
≤ 2
2
n
∑n
i=1
1
2 log(2πe(PSc+σ
2
1+σ
2
2)) (39)
= 2πe(PSc + σ
2
1 + σ
2
2) (40)
Using this in (36), and taking the log we get,
H(Z)−H(Z|XS) ≥
n
2
log
(
1 +
1
2πe
∑
j∈S 2
2
n
H(Xj)
PSc + σ21 + σ
2
2
)
(41)
which, with (34) completes the proof. To see the corollary,
I(XK;Y|Z) = H(XK|Z)−H(XK|Y,Z) (42)
= H(XK|Z)−H(XK|Y) (43)
= [H(Z|XK) +H(XK)−H(Z)]
− [H(Y|XK) +H(XK)−H(Y)] (44)
= [H(Z|XK)−H(Y|XK)]− [H(Z)−H(Y)] (45)
=
n∑
i=1
[H(Zi|XK,i)−H(Yi|XK,i)]− [H(Z) −H(Y)](46)
=
[n
2
log
(
2πe(σ21 + σ
2
2)
)
−
n
2
log
(
2πeσ21
)]
− [H(Z)−H(Y)] (47)
≤
n
2
log
(
1 +
σ22
σ21
)
−
n
2
log
(
1 +
σ22
PK + σ21
)
(48)
= C(M)sum − C
(MW)
sum (49)
where (43) is due to XK → Y → Z and (46) to the memory-
lessness of the channels. (48) follows from Corollary 6.1.
This and Lemma 5, complete the proof of Theorem 2.
Corollary 2.1 follows from Corollary 7.1 and Lemma 5.
Corollary 2.2 follows simply with H(Xj) = n2 log 2πePj .
APPENDIX II
ACHIEVABLE RATES
Let R = (R1, . . . , RK) satisfy (8) and (11). For each user
k ∈ K, consider the scheme:
1) Let Mk = 2n(Rk−ǫ′) where 0 ≤ ǫ′ < ǫ. Let Mk = MksMk0
where Mks = Mµkk , Mk0 = M
1−µk
k , and µk ≥ δ will be
chosen later. Then, Rk = Rks + Rk0 + ǫ′ where Rks =
1
n
logMks and Rk0 = 1n logMk0. We can choose ǫ
′ and n
to ensure that Mks,Mk0 are integers.
2) Generate 3 codebooks Xks,Xk0 and Xkx. Xks consists of
Mks codewords, each component of which is drawn ∼
N (0, λksPk − ε). Codebook Xk0 has Mk0 codewords with
each component randomly drawn ∼ N (0, λk0Pk − ε) and
Xkx has Mkx codewords with each component randomly
drawn ∼ N (0, λkxPk − ε) where ε is an arbitrarily small
number to ensure that the power constraints on the code-
words are satisfied with high probability and λks + λk0 +
λkx = 1. Define Rkx = 1n logMkx and Mkt = MkMkx.
3) Each message Wk ∈ {1, . . . ,Mk} is mapped into a message
vector Wk = (Wks,Wk0) where Wks ∈ {1, . . . ,Mks}
and Wk0 ∈ {1, . . . ,Mk0}. Since Wk is uniformly chosen,
Wks,Wk0 are also uniformly distributed.
4) To transmit message Wk ∈ {1, . . . ,Mk}, user k finds the
2 codewords corresponding to components of Wk and also
uniformly chooses a codeword from Xkx. He then adds all
these codewords and transmits the resulting codeword, Xk,
so that we are actually transmitting one of Mkt codewords.
Let Rkt = 1n logMkt + ǫ
′ = Rks +Rk0 +Rkx + ǫ
′
.
We will choose the rates such that for all S ⊆ K,∑
k∈SRks =
∑
k∈SµkRk ≤ C
(M)
S − C˜
(MW)
S (50)∑K
k=1[Rk0 +Rkx] =
∑K
k=1[(1− µk)Rk +Rkx] = C
(MW)
sum(51)∑
k∈SRkt =
∑
k∈S [Rk + Rkx] ≤ C
(M)
S (52)
From (52) and the GMAC coding theorem, with high probabil-
ity the receiver can decode the codewords with low probability
of error. To show ∆S ≥ δ, ∀S ⊆ K, we concern ourselves
only with MAC sub-code {Xks}Kk=1. From this point of view,
the coding scheme described is equivalent to each user k ∈ K
selecting one of Mks messages, and sending a uniformly
chosen codeword from among Mk0Mkx codewords for each.
Let W(s)S = {Wks}k∈S and ∆
(s)
S =
H(W
(s)
S
|Z)
H(W
(s)
S
)
and define
XΣ =
∑K
k=1Xk. For K write
∆(s)K =
H(W(s)K |Z)
H(W(s)K )
=
H(W(s)K ,Z)−H(Z)
H(W(s)K )
(53)
=
H(W(s)K ,XΣ,Z)−H(XΣ|W
(s)
K ,Z)−H(Z)
H(W(s)K )
(54)
=
H(W(s)K ) +H(Z|W
(s)
K ,XΣ)−H(Z)
H(W(s)K )
+
H(XΣ|W
(s)
K )−H(XΣ|W
(s)
K ,Z)
H(W(s)K )
(55)
= 1−
I(XΣ;Z)− I(XΣ;Z|W
(s)
K )
n
(∑K
k=1 Rks
) (56)
where we used W(s)K → XΣ → Z ⇒ H(Z|W
(s)
K ,XΣ) =
H(Z|XΣ) to get (56). We will consider the two terms individ-
ually. First, we have the trivial bound due to channel capacity:
I(XΣ;Z) ≤ nC
(MW)
sum (57)
I(XΣ;Z|W
(s)
K ) = H(XΣ|W
(s)
K )−H(XΣ|W
(s)
K ,Z). Since
user k sends one of Mk0Mkx codewords for each message,
H(XΣ|W
(s)
K ) = log
(∏K
k=1Mk0Mkx
) (58)
= n
∑K
k=1[(1− µk)Rk +Rkx] (59)
We can also write
H(XΣ|W
(s)
K ,Z) ≤ nη
′
n (60)
where η′n → 0 as n → ∞ since, with high probability, the
eavesdropper can decode XΣ given W(s)K due to (51). Using
(50), (51), (57), (59) and (60) in (56), we get
∆(s)K ≥ 1−
C(MW)sum −
∑K
k=1 [(1 − µk)Rk +Rkx] + η
′
n
C(M)sum − C
(MW)
sum
(61)
= 1−
η′n
C(M)sum − C
(MW)
sum
→ 1 as η′n → 0 (62)
Then,
H(W(s)K |Z) = H(W
(s)
K ) (63)
H(W(s)S |Z) +H(W
(s)
Sc |Z) ≥ H(W
(s)
S ) +H(W
(s)
Sc) (64)
As conditioning reduces entropy, we have H(W(s)S |Z) ≤
H(W(s)S ) and H(W
(s)
Sc |Z) ≤ H(W
(s)
Sc). Then, from the
above equation we conclude that we must have H(W(s)S ) =
H(W(s)S |Z), ∀S ⊂ K. This makes ∆
(s)
S = 1 ∀S ⊂ K. The
proof is completed by noting that
∆S ≥
H(W(s)S |Z)
H(WS)
=
H(W(s)S )
H(WS)
=
∑
k∈SµkRk∑
k∈SRk
≥ δ (65)
We can think of {Wks} as the “protected” messages and
{Wk0} as the “unprotected” messages. The corollary is appar-
ent from (62), and also follows as (11) implies (8) if δ = 1.
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